Transhumanism and Phenomenological Reduction

What properties of consciousness and mind will remain the same in a posthuman world? Will enhanced minds look at themselves and reality like we do? What can we learn from cognitive science and consciousness studies to help answer these questions? What are some ethical consequences of enhancing the brain/mind?

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Complete entry

Posted by David Roden  on  02/05  at  08:34 AM

I'm very interested in the philosophical confrontation between phenomenology (transcendental and otherwise) but I'm not sure that this article addresses the issues clearly enough. For example, is the writer talking about transcendental consciousness or empirical consciousness? In his discussion of epoche it is not clear whether he talking about consciousness qua noema or noesis?

Every individual consciousness (for Husserl) exemplifies the transcendental structures of consciousness (they are not distinct entities) but the two kinds of consciousness are functionally distinct.

Even if we grant the possibility of a transcendental phenomenological epoche (one which I would question - See my 'Naturalising Deconstruction' http://www.springerlink.com/content/n80120114j322313/ ) can know that consciousness qua transcendental will be characterized by the same kinds of structure?

Finally, the meme model of cultural transmission is assumed here without serious consideration of alternatives such as epigenetic models.

Posted by Dan Russell  on  02/05  at  01:40 PM

Very thought-provoking stuff, Kris. It's scary to think of the evolutionary triumph of consciousness dying out with humans. It would be an amazing achievement for humanity to build electronic minds capable of consciousness.

Posted by alexxarian  on  02/06  at  07:56 PM

As a collective, we are still almost completely overlooking the drastic implications of Open Individualism. This may well be the most disruptive paradigm shift ever experienced by our species, or perhaps I should say mind.

Posted by Kris Notaro  on  02/11  at  12:19 AM

This paper is not meant to take on transcendental consciousness, but it does assume that there might be elements of such, and I also treated a priori knowledge as if it is still a problem for epistemology and ontology.

Because of the persuasive theory of Emergentism, I personally remain agnostic about transcendental/empirical matters.

However, I do think that phenomenological mineness or "I"ness, within a philosophy of mind and consciousness studies context may be explained in a panpsychist framework, not yet understood.

The notion of the enhanced mind forms a problem - what does sped up cognition, enhanced memory, and addition of new cyborg/biological senses do for science, philosophy, mind, and consciousness?

Posted by David Roden  on  02/11  at  10:34 AM

I think transcendentalism does raise some serious problems though.

If subjectivity and mind have a priori structures - e.g. temporality, embodiment - then those invariants would have to apply to post-human subjects as well as humans.

Similarly, if reality is only thinkable as reality for-a-constitutive subject with such and such a transcendental structure, then any putatively post-human understanding of the world would a) have to conform to these same invariants or b) have to be so radically 'other' that our approach to it would be indistinguishable from a kind of mysticism.

I hasten to add, that I reject the claim that reality is just the intentional correlate of a transcendental subject. But many philosophers in the Continental tradition don't so it's a claim that transhumanists and posthumanists need to take seriously.

Posted by alexxarian  on  02/11  at  11:04 AM

I strongly recommend taking a look at this paper. It is a short summary which deals with the implications of Quantum Mechanics on materialism. I do not know who wrote it.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/12852531/Can-Matter-Be-Explained-in-Terms-of-Consciousness

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